Avoiding or Accepting Conflict in Public Talk by Duchesne, Sophie & Haegel, Florence
British Journal of Political Science
http://journals.cambridge.org/JPS
Additional services for British Journal of Political Science:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Avoiding or Accepting Conict in Public Talk
SOPHIE DUCHESNE and FLORENCE HAEGEL
British Journal of Political Science / Volume 37 / Issue 01 / January 2007, pp 1 - 22
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000014, Published online: 13 December 2006
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123407000014
How to cite this article:
SOPHIE DUCHESNE and FLORENCE HAEGEL (2007). Avoiding or Accepting Conict in Public
Talk. British Journal of Political Science, 37, pp 1-22 doi:10.1017/S0007123407000014
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JPS, IP address: 193.54.67.94 on 09 Jul 2014
B.J.Pol.S. 37, 1-22 Copyright © 2006 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0007123407000014 Printed in the United Kingdom
Avoiding or Accepting Conflict in Public Talk
SOPHIE DUCHESNE A N D FLORENCE HAEGEL*
This article gives an account of experimental research conducted in France with focus groups on delinquency.
It is based on theoretical work which shows how the political is partly a mode of expression as well as a way
of addressing conflict. An empirical analysis is presented of how people take or resist the risk of conflict in
public discussion over social issues. The group discussions corroborate previous insights by attesting that
conflict in public discussion is generally latent and often repressed. Specific analysis follows of those processes
that contribute to the rare transformation from latent to overt conflict, highlighting the evidence that the public
expression of conflict proceeds from participants’ alliances and biographical narratives. Moreover, a certain
hierarchy of social identification is seen among the participants. The influence of political competence on
political implication is complex.
Political discussion has long been considered a basic element of any civic culture.1 As a
mode of political participation, however, it is usually ranked amongst the less influential
ones.2 Hence, it has been studied less than other types of political participation, such as
voting, membership of political organizations or demonstrating, although some stimulat-
ing work has been carried out.3 This demonstrates how fruitful the study of political
discussion is in understanding the complexity of the politicization of citizens in modern
democracies. Pamela Conover, Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, in a recent survey of
everyday political discussion published in this Journal,4 show that British and American
citizens, as self-reported, tend to avoid political discussion outside the protected arena of
close acquaintances and family. Their survey, using focus groups, shows that participants
indeed greatly distrust the conflicts that can arise from confrontation between points of
view.
Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, politics has to do with conflict-based
mechanisms, which should not be considered pathological.5 The agonistic concept of the
political has recently taken centre stage again, following both a critique of Habermas’s
* Cevipof (CNRS; and Sciences Po Paris, respectively). This article was translated by Christine Hamidi and
Kathy Bramble. The authors are grateful to Elizabeth Frazer and David Goldey, as well as Albert Weale and the
anonymous reviewers of the article, who did a great deal in adapting the very French first draft of this article to
British standards.
1 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).
2 Donald D. Searing, Pamela J. Conover, Ivor Crewe and Fred Solt, ‘Studying Everyday Talk in the
Deliberative System: Does Democratic Discussion Make Better Citizens?’ (paper presented at the Conference on
‘Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics’, European University Institute, 2004).
3 William Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding
Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and,
more recently, Katherine Kramer Walsh, Talking about Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).
4 Pamela J. Conover, Donald Searing and Ivor Crewe, ‘The Deliberative Potential of Discussion’, British
Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 21–62.
5 Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation (London: The Free Press, 1955).
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theories6 and the debate about the deliberative model of democracy.7 The agonistic
tradition shows how, in complex pluralist unequal societies, the political is in part a mode
of expression as well as a way of addressing conflict. Political discussion is, therefore, far
from being rational argumentation conducted by free, equal and impartial individuals.
Following Carl Schmitt’s work, this tradition underlines the specificity of the political,
grounded on the logic of inclusion–exclusion and on the possibility of tracing lines of
demarcation that separate different categories of people and put them into opposition to
each other.8 As Carl Schmitt wrote: ‘In the domain of the political, people do not face each
other as abstractions but as politically interested and politically determined persons, as
citizens, governors or governed, politically allied or opponents – in any case, therefore,
in political categories’.9
The scope and degree of violence in the conflicts that characterize a political system vary
greatly. In Western democracies, this form of politicization gives rise to constant and
fragile arbitration procedures, so that the word ‘conflict’ might seem inappropriate. To
justify its use, first, let us remind the reader that, in French at least, though the concept
of disagreement (de´saccord) only refers to the rupture of union, of harmony, or of
understanding, the word conflict (conflit) implies that the rupture is fully and publicly
acknowledged, that the opposing forces are both organized and identifiable – an essential
point when it comes to analysing politics. In the English definition, conflict refers to
possible clashes and to the notion of incompatibility.10 In other words, the word ‘conflict’
lays stress on public expression and on the encounter between antagonistic forces in a
democratic political community.
At the macro level, emerging conflicts within the political community are supposedly
mirrored in party-political and ideological cleavages and come into play in electoral
competition before they eventually get resolved through the processes at work in
public action. A political community is not only a public sphere, but also a society
divided along long-term social and ideological lines. Following a long tradition in
political science, we will refer to these lines dividing the political community as
‘cleavages’.11
At the micro level, conflict is also at stake in the dynamic of political discussion and
more precisely, in the reluctance to express political opinions and commitments. When
people discuss, and more particularly when unacquainted people discuss in a public setting,
6 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993); Jacques Rancie`re, La Me´sentente
(Paris: Galilee, 1995).
7 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1996); Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
Stephen Macedo, Deliberative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy
and Political Deliberation’, Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338–68.
8 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976).
9 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. 11, quoted by Chantal Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy’,
in Chantal Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London/New York: Verso, 1999), pp. 38–53, at p. 41.
10
‘Conflict fig. Of interests, opinions, statements, feelings, etc.: To come into collision, to clash; to be at
variance, be incompatible. (Now the chief sense.)’ Oxford English Dictionary.
11 Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of
Development (Oslo: Universitetsvolaget, 1970); Alan Zuckermann, ‘Political Cleavages: A Conceptual and
Theoretical Analysis’, British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 231–48; Alan Zuckermann, ‘New
Approaches to Political Cleavages’, Comparative Politics, 15 (1982), 131–44; Stefano Bartolini, ‘La Formation
des clivages’, Revue internationale de politique compare´e, 12 (2005), 9–34.
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points of disagreement may occur between group members that are not just occasional,
anecdotal and personal oppositions, but overlap with the conflicts within society at large.
That is why we will use the same term ‘cleavage’ to refer to the main lines of conflict in
the group discussion. While giving his or her opinion, a participant also says where he or
she is regarding to a specific cleavage, and takes the risk of acknowledging that he or she
does not belong to the same side as the others.
In this research, we have thus adopted a specific angle of observation of political
discussion: we observe how participants take or resist the risk of conflict in a discussion
over a social issue and expect from it a different understanding of the individual process
of politicization. This article aims to take stock of our findings so far.12 It is designed to
draw lessons from the analysis of three experimental focus groups organized in France on
the topic of delinquency, prior to organizing additional groups and adding a comparative
dimension. In the first section, we present the research design and explain our main
methodological choices. In the second section, we present the main results of the study:
while the discussions do reveal latent conflict, overt conflict is very rare. In the third and
last section, we analyse conflict mechanisms revealed by the discussion: the interweaving
of the individual and the collective through alliances and biographical narratives; the
hierarchy of identification; the complex effect of political competence.
RESEARCH DESIGN: DISCUSSION GROUPS FOCUSING ON DELINQUENCY
The practical difficulties of observing and recording informal everyday talk are quite
considerable. We use focus groups instead, since they allow us to observe what matters
most to us: the exchange of viewpoints in a collective, public and interactive setting, where
disagreement can be expressed. These focus groups were recruited, conducted and
analysed according to specific methodological choices.
Recruitment
The technique of focus groups and other discussion groups is less widely used in France
than in English-speaking countries.13 These focus groups were arranged according to a
well-tried method so as to gather people with fairly similar social profiles, in an attempt
to mitigate the effects of the underlying inequalities in people’s relation to public discourse.
Homogeneity is frequently sought through groups made up of previously acquainted
people, as in Gamson’s work;14 failing that, one or two simple criteria are selected that are
supposed to define the social profile of the participants. The criteria were selected to ensure
homogeneity in the type of job held by each participant, or rather the type of job aspired
to, since the participants were all contacted through an employment exchange.
Chronologically, the first group consisted of unskilled workers; the second group was
12 Sophie Duchesne and Florence Haegel, ‘Entretiens dans la cite´, ou comment la parole se politise’,
EspacesTempsLesCahiers, 76/77 (2001), 95–109. Sophie Duchesne, Florence Haegel et al., ‘Politisation et
conflictualisation: de la compe´tence a` l’implication’, in Pascal Perrineau, ed., Le De´senchantement de´mocratique
(La Tour d’Aigue: Les Editions de l’Aube, 2003); Sophie Duchesne and Florence Haegel, L’Enqueˆte et ses
me´thodes: Les entretiens collectifs (Paris: Nathan (collection 128), 2004).
13 David L. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, Qualitative Research Methods Series v. 16
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997); Duchesne and Haegel, L’Enqueˆte et ses me´thodes.
14 Gamson, Talking Politics.
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composed of managers, and the third one of office workers. The socio-professional
homogeneity of the various groups turned out to be relative; we shall come back to that
later. Furthermore, the groups were heterogeneous according to other criteria, such as age,
gender or political orientations, among other things. A characteristic of these groups that
played an important role in the dynamics of conflict was the variation in the ethnic origins
of the participants. Although it conforms to the current multicultural society of France, this
heterogeneity is rarely so clearly represented in a survey.
Group of unskilled workers
Nacer: Egyptian citizen; living in France since 1992; no religion; slightly interested in
politics; will not disclose his political orientations.
Khaled: French citizen; no religion; ‘slightly’ interested in politics; politically, neither
right-wing nor left-wing.
Kassam: French citizen; a practising Muslim; not at all interested in politics; politically,
neither right-wing nor left-wing.
Mansour: Malian citizen; living in France since 1989; a practising Muslim; keenly
interested in politics; a left-winger (he declares that he is a Communist).
Ge´rard: French citizen; not at all interested in politics; politically, neither right-wing nor
left-wing.
Manuel: French citizen; not at all interested in politics; no political orientation.
Group of managers
Jordan: French citizen; born in the West Indies; has been living in metropolitan France
since 1972; a non-practising Catholic; keenly interested in politics. Political orientation:
‘My friends regard me as a right-winger. I think our politicians should be retired and
replaced by younger men in their late 20s or early 30s. And the retirement age should be
set at 70.’
Aline: French citizen; a non-practising Catholic; slightly interested in politics; leans
towards the left.
Jessica: French citizen; a non-practising Protestant; slightly interested in politics; leans
towards the left.
Faiz: French citizen; born in Chad; a practising Protestant (his father is a minister); keenly
interested in politics; politically, a left-winger.
Coline: French citizen of West Indian descent; a Catholic; keenly interested in politics;
leans towards the left.
Guillaume: French citizen; has no religion; keenly interested in politics; politically, a
left-winger.
Franc¸ois: French citizen; a non-practising Catholic; keenly interested in politics;
politically, a left-winger.
Group of office workers
Tarek: French citizen, born in Algeria; will not disclose whether he has a religion or not;
keenly interested in politics; leans towards the left.
Jean-Claude: French citizen; he will not disclose whether he has a religion or not; keenly
interested in politics; refuses to disclose his political orientation.
Hassen: French citizen; born in Tunisia; non-practising Muslim; not at all interested in
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politics (but proclaims that he is knowledgeable about political matters), neither right-wing
nor left-wing.
Farouk: Moroccan citizen; non-practising Muslim; slightly interested in politics. About his
political orientation, writes, ‘As I see it, all parties are pretty much alike.’
Monique: French citizen; non-practising Catholic; keenly interested in politics; politically,
a right-winger.
Marie: French citizen; regular church-goer (has not specified her religion); slightly
interested in politics. Refuses to disclose her political orientations (after Jean-Claude has
publicly refused to disclose his).
Christiane: French citizen; non-practising Catholic; slightly interested in politics; leans
towards the left.
We chose to recruit previously unacquainted people. Those who took part in the focus
group discussions had never met before; we wanted them to feel as if they were taking part
in a public debate. But because they were not acquainted, it was important that the
discussion lasted long enough for them to become accustomed to each other’s ideas and
positions. Allowing plenty of time for the discussions (three hours) permited us to really
observe the participants’ mixed feelings and tensions, as well as the changes in their
viewpoints. These variations can be grasped within the context of the social interactions
born from discussion, thus taking account of the social relations between the participants,
particularly their influence-strategies and the effects of self-censorship.
Choosing to contact people through an employment exchange and to pay them for
their participation, we aimed to recruit a type of person who rarely features in surveys. In
this particular instance, French scientific tradition differs widely from British or American
practice. In France, paying interviewees is generally regarded as something that should be
reserved for commercial polling, on the grounds that private gain may bias people’s
answers. But we consider that the motivations inducing people to give some of their time
and to air their views to some anonymous surveying team are even more likely to bias their
answers. In fact, selecting interviewees from among job-seekers allowed us to make up
groups in which ethnic minorities were well represented and in which discursive and
political competence varied widely. This did, however, bias the participants in an
unprecedented, at times embarrassing, way. Some of them tended to mistake a focus group
discussion for a job interview. This was particularly the case among the executives, as the
discussion was offering them an opportunity to give evidence of their capacity to work
together.15 For all that, the main weakness in our research design lies in the limited number
of focus groups. As each socio-professional group is represented by one focus group only,
we tend to ascribe all the differences between the groups to this single variable, when many
of them may equally be accounted for by other factors, including group dynamics.
This research was first designed as experimental. The very small number of focus groups
actually did facilitate the analysis of processes. This article presents the hypotheses taken
from this experimentation that we are currently testing on a larger scale.16 We are aware
of the limited transferability of our results so far. However, it must be noted that the content
of the discussion and especially the main cleavages that were revealed by the dynamics
15 Jordan even left us his curriculum vitae.
16
‘How Discussion Becomes Political’, a comparative research programme involving Elizabeth Frazer (New
College, Oxford), Andre´-Paul Frognier (University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) and the authors, funded by
the French Ministry of Research, Sciences Po Paris, the Leverhulme Trust and the Belgian FNRS.
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of conflict indeed corresponded, to a large extent, to those that emerge from extensive
quantitative surveys.
Organization of Discussion
The topic to be discussed was not revealed beforehand. The participants were asked to
discuss delinquency, a controversial topic which we had chosen because it offers a lot of
advantages for testing a conflict-based analysis of public discussion. It occupies centre
stage in the French political scene: one year after we had organized our focus groups,
law-and-order became the central issue in the 2002 presidential campaign.17 In addition,
this topic is dealt with by a sufficiently wide range of players to be likely to be of interest
to a lot of people without any particular competence or experience in the matter. Another
requirement was that the topic offered could be politicized during the discussion to various
degrees and in different ways. And indeed it enabled us to observe different expressions
of politicization, ranging from ‘Immigrants are to blame for the rise in delinquency’, to
‘Unemployment breeds delinquency’, to ‘Parents no longer do their job, there are too many
broken families’, to ‘It’s a matter of values’, etc.
An important aspect of our focus groups is the method we adopted to facilitate
discussions. Our facilitation method was adapted from that developed by Metaplan®, a
German consultancy. Facilitation consists in recording the views of the participants, as they
are being expressed, on flipcharts, so that they can reflect upon and react to what they have
been saying. The crucial characteristic of this method is that it encourages people to express
dissent. The facilitator expressly invites participants’ reactions, urging them to express any
form of hesitation about what she is recording – be it incomprehension, a desire for a change
in wording, for greater precision, and above all, dissent. It gives to the expression of dissent
a less dramatic, even playful dimension. Every time a participant voices reservations about
the way a point has been recorded, a ‘flashmark’ is made next to the relevant sentence,
which is specifically discussed at the end of the session. This discussion focuses on the
expression of dissent. This so-called ‘flashmarking’ procedure18 is laid down as a basic
rule of the game and gives rise, particularly at the beginning, to a great many jokes, which
helps allay the nervousness of the participants. Instructions are given to the moderator to
suggest flashmarks during the first question in order for the participants to get used to it.
The original moderation technique is far from being a laissez-faire approach, it is meant
to keep the discussion under strict control. The facilitator plays a very central role. Even
though he constantly asks the group for confirmation, he is the one who writes down and
therefore selects the views that will be recorded. However, we adapted the technique for
our research purposes. We found that too much control prevents the expression of conflict.
Moreover, we had originally been trained as ‘non-directive’ interviewers.19 As a
consequence, we adapted the moderation technique in two ways. First, the original method
aims at recording a large range of opinions in order to find the space available for consensus
or decision, but does not look for going in greater depth into the opinions expressed. We
introduced some degree of in-depth listening and have tended to write on the board as
17 Jacques Gerstle´, ‘Une Feneˆtre d’opportunite´ e´lectorale’, in Pascal Perrineau and Colette Ysmal, eds, Le Vote
de tous les refus (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2003), pp. 29–52.
18 There are three rules of the game that are formally laid down at the onset of the discussion: ‘Speaking-time
must not exceed thirty seconds’, ‘Everything must be discussed in writing’, ‘Dissent must be noted with a mark’.
19 Carl Rogers, ‘The Non-Directive Method as a Technique for Social Research’, American Journal of
Sociology, 50 (1945), 279–89.
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extensively as possible what was said by participants instead of selecting the most
interesting topic for the group dynamic. Secondly, although we recorded systematically
all disagreements, we did not get the group to confront them as much as a professional
moderator would have done. We found that displaying too much conflict generates
defensive or avoidance strategies. Once the moderator knew the participants were aware
of the main disagreements between them, she would let them handle these in their own
way.20 Hence the balance between control and laissez-faire changes according to the
dynamics of the discussion. It is more controlled in the beginning, in order to get the group
established.
The moderation technique has one final specificity; it also includes the preparation of
a scenario. A scenario displays a range of topics, and elicits different modes of answers,
individually or in subgroups, alternating open questions, contradictory arguments, role
playing, voting (see the Appendix for the scenario used in this research project, which gives
an idea of the possible variations). The variety of questions helps to channel the dynamics
of conflict acknowledgement.
Analysis
All the sessions were both audio-taped and video-taped. Videotapes constitute the chief
material for the analysis, but they are supplemented by the sheets of paper recording the
main points of the discussions, as well as by the observer’s notes – a research assistant
having made a manual record all the way through the discussion. Once the data have been
collected, the next step is to determine how they are going to be analysed, what is going
to be subjected to observation and interpretation, and what results will eventually emerge.
Considering that the design of the research was meant to be experimental, we did not
proceed to a systematic coding of the corpus: we thought the sample would not allow us
to do any kind of statistically significant analysis of what had actually been said during
the discussions. We choose to focus the analysis on some specific points of the discussions.
Following the agonistic theory of politics, we have selected the moments when the
participants hesitated to take the risk of explicitly disagreeing – about ideas, interests or
values – with their interlocutors. These ‘sensitive moments’ are clearly perceptible in the
dynamics of discussion, when individuals obviously hesitate explicitly to advance an
opinion which is likely to result in open conflict with the others.21 Antagonistic viewpoints
are then expressed and are related to pre-existing cleavages, so that opposing sides become
visible. In fact, these sensitive moments are not only moments of revelation, when the
cleavages become explicit. They are mainly moments of avoidance, when conflicts are
defused, for, from our observation, it appears that in most cases, potentially conflicting
social interactions eventually get defused.
Empirically, the points at which conflict occurs can of course be identified from what
is being said, but also from the changes in inflection or pace of speech, or from an
amplification of body language – the participants moving closer to, or away from the centre
point of the discussion as well as each other. The greatest merit of the focus-group
technique is that it enables us to grasp what is going on at group level, as well as the
20 The ‘she’ here reflects the fact that the moderator was a woman in each case.
21 Jenny Kitzinger and Clare Farquhar, ‘The Analytical Potential of Sensitive Moments in Focus Group
Discussions’, in R. S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger, eds, Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and
Practice (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 156–72.
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individual position of each participant, simultaneously and with equal clarity.22 Our
analysis of how people avoid or accept conflict in public discussion takes into consideration
both levels. We observe the individual involvement of participants in the discussion and
try to find out how and why each of them individually gets involved or not in a specific
exchange, at a specific point. But we also take into account to what extent a specific conflict
establishes itself in the group and involves many of the participants. We thus analyse how
a latent conflict may turn into an open one.
CONFLICT IN PUBLIC DISCUSSION IS GENERALLY LATENT AND OFTEN
DEFUSED
Analysing these group discussions by looking for conflict involves working on mere traces,
for one of the first findings of the experimental work is that open conflict is a rare
occurrence. Pamela Conover and her colleagues also reported that one of the reasons given
by British and American focus-group participants for avoiding political discussions
was the private character of their opinions.23 They claim that anyone has the right to hold
his/her own opinions and not to have to justify or defend them in public. Indeed, in our
groups we did observe the tension that participants experienced between wanting to protect
the private character of their own opinions and the desire to reveal them to others in
confronting their views. Basically, the dynamics of public discussion depends on the way
the participants assume the risk of engaging in conflict with persons who are more or less
strangers. It depends on how far participants feel authorized to or confident enough to take
such a risk; we will come back to that shortly. But it also presupposes that they are able
– however imperfectly – to perceive and evaluate the risk that their opinion may give rise
to a conflict. And this implies that they have accurately decoded the implications of the
views which are being exchanged.
Conflict Latent in the Confusion of Ordinary Talk
In many cases, the points of disagreement are not acknowledged as such: they are left
unsaid because ordinary talk is basically disorganized. We have observed in these groups,
particularly in the early stages of the discussion, that a lot of potential conflicts simply
remain latent, dissolved in the free flow of a conversation where sentences follow on one
another and ideas are juxtaposed, without anyone making any connection between them.
Let us look at a first example, taken from the office workers’ discussion. They were asked
to work in groups and complete a story about delinquency (see interview guide in the
Appendix). One of the stories they wrote told of children who stole clothes in a
supermarket, while the other customers watched them without concern. The authors of this
22 The debate over the relevant level of analysis of the focus group is an essential one. In contrast to the early
days of experimental research, when focus groups were used for economy of scale and also to encourage the
expression of certain opinions (see R. K. Merton with M. Fiske and P. L. Kendall, The Focused Interview: A
Manual of Problems and Procedures (New York: The Free Press, 1990 [1956])), some have gone so far as to argue
that the relevant level can only be that of the group, as do B. F. Crabtree, M. K. Yanoshik, W. L. Miller and
P. J. O’Connor, ‘Selecting Individual or Group Interviews’, in D. L. Morgan, ed., Successful Focus Groups:
Advancing the State of the Art (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993), pp.137–49. Our view is that playing on both
levels is more efficient, both to make sure that the material is dependable (an argument also put forward by
M. A. Carey and M. W. Smith, ‘Capturing the Group Effect in Focus Group: A Special Concern in Analysis’,
Qualitative Health Research, 4 (1994), 123–7), and, as this article should make clear, to make the most of the
method.
23 Conover, Searing and Crewe, ‘The Deliberative Potential of Discussion’, pp. 54–5.
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story insisted that the children did not believe they would be punished, on the escalation
of events being at the core of delinquency and, hence, on the responsibility of adults in
the matter. They called the story ‘who steals an egg steals an ox’ (a French saying
equivalent to ‘You may as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb’). Tarek presented the
story on behalf of the group because it was based on a true story, in which he had taken
part. Telling about his own behaviour, he kept saying that he was purely a spectator, that
he was there by chance, waiting for his wife, and that he was just amazed by the lack of
concern shown by the by-standers. The discussion went on for a while, in quite a lively
fashion; nobody ever commented on Tarek’s possible contradiction between his evaluation
of other people’s behaviour and his own.
Our interpretation is that the collective silence on Tarek’s own responsibility was not
just a way of avoiding putting him on the spot – ‘face-work’ as Goffman calls it.24 A
detailed analysis of the conversation shows that the participants did not see the
contradiction. To emphasize the effect of the disorganization of ordinary talk, let us
consider a second example, taken from the discussion between the unskilled workers. All
the participants were looking at the facilitator intently, eager to put in a word, each one
asserting his own view as if it backed up the previously stated one.
Extract 1 (Unskilled workers): ‘Parents abdicate responsibility’
MANSOUR: I had also said it’s because they won’t let us raise our kids as we wish. They take
our children into care.
KHALED: What they [meaning parents and children] need to do is talk.
MANUEL: They are just plain irresponsible. What they need is a kick up the arse. Some parents
have … too many problems on their own hands, so they don’t look after their children.
MANSOUR: The real problem is that it prevents them from doing as they see fit with their kids.
No parent is going to tell his child to go and hold up a bank. They are afraid of losing their
kids.
KHALED: They simply abdicate all responsibility for their children!
Three very different views about the relations between parents, children and society are
expressed in this sequence. Mansour, who was born in Mali, wishes parents were allowed
to bring up their children as they wish, using corporal punishment according to African
tradition if necessary, which contravenes French law forbidding ill treatment of children.
Khaled, born in France and of Algerian descent, holds the view that parents do not talk
enough with their children; and Manuel, for his part, feels that too many parents prefer to
look after themselves rather than pay heed to the problems with which their children may
be confronted. These various viewpoints are potentially antagonistic, since they reflect
different attitudes towards and perhaps experiences of the exercise of authority, but the
participants do not seem to be aware of this. In fact, this way of carrying on a discussion
is by no means exceptional, since, in ordinary conversation, viewpoints are often
exchanged without any logical connection between them being established and without
their potential for contradiction, disagreement or conflict being acknowledged. As Lynn
Sanders rightly stated in her article ‘Against Deliberation’,25 contrary to the expectations
of the deliberative model, everyday talk is neither rational nor orientated towards a
common topic of discussion. Public expression of conflict presupposes that participants
decode the consequences of the views they are exchanging with the other members of their
24 Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-To-Face Behaviour (New York: Pantheon, 1982).
25 Lynn M Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, Political Theory, 25 (1997), 347–76.
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focus group. The nature of the discussion needs to be appropriate, a condition far from
always realised in the group discussions.
Conflict Dissolved by Cognitive Competence
In order to decode the potential conflict, participants must have the cognitive ability to do
so. But cognitive skills have various effects. They supply the resources needed to spot
contradictions or inconsistencies but, paradoxically, they may also have a dissolving effect
on conflict. Thus the ‘learned’ stance adopted by the group of managers induced them from
the outset to try to come up with a definition of delinquency, not using examples as a
starting-point, but discussing criteria which might define the scope of the phenomenon:
age, premeditation, the unlawfulness of the acts under consideration, etc. Faiz (we will
come back to him later) was the only one who insisted on stopping that game (‘This is
getting us nowhere’). He attempted to make the other participants acknowledge that
delinquency is usually blamed on young second-generation immigrants and hence to
address the political debate related to delinquency. It was clear, however, that nobody else
was prepared to engage in a potentially conflictual debate about immigration.
Conversely, there is the example of the group of unskilled workers, a group actually
largely composed of young second-generation immigrants among whom unemployment
is particularly high. They were used to being regarded as delinquents – so much so that
some of them clearly suspected the researchers of having chosen that particular topic just
to confound them. Their discussion revolved from the start around the causes of and the
responsibilities for delinquency and the way it is dealt with. From the outset, they offered
a hotchpotch of major explanatory factors: unemployment, restrictions of freedom of
expression and children’s upbringing, as well as the corruption of politicians and
discrimination, giving the discussion a definitely overt conflictual turn.
The experience of these two focus groups highlights the reluctance to simplify and the
taste for sophistication of the managers, who displayed more highly developed cognitive
skills, which prevent conflict. By contrast, the unskilled workers’ relative lack thereof
induced them to express views structured along an overtly acknowledged cleavage.26
Conflict Repressed Because It Involves Taking a Risk
Since getting involved in a discussion means taking the risk of engaging in conflict, one
also has to feel authorized to do so. This feeling of legitimacy is not evenly distributed
in society. This could support the general point made by Sanders against deliberation:
the fundamental inequality of participants in discussion is a direct consequence of the
fundamental inequalities of social relationships.27 A number of empirical elements
corroborate this. For example, in the group of office workers, gender inequalities are clearly
visible (in contrast to the all-male group of unskilled workers). Two of the female
participants, holding the most menial jobs within that group, stayed in the background
practically throughout the session. But we know that they share the views of Jean-Claude,
26 Furthermore, as we said before, the situation, very similar for the executives to some kind of job interview,
promoted a tendency towards co-operation that is not a good basis for the expression of conflict. This kind of
discussion was obviously totally unfamiliar to the unskilled workers. They could not confuse it with a professional
test where their capacity to collaborate would be required.
27 Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, pp. 363–5.
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one of the most talkative male participants. They acquiesce by nodding their heads or
glancing at him when he speaks. Instead of getting involved and joining forces with him
to engage in conflict with the other participants, they remained silent, contributing to the
session’s definite tone of repressed conflict.
We know from interactionist work that public everyday talk does not promote the
expression of disagreement.28 Indeed, in these groups, participants avoid openly
expressing disagreement with one another and open conflict rarely happens. Conflict is
either latent or repressed. However, some sequences of the discussion are obviously
‘sensitive moments’ where the talk becomes uneasy and the tension between the
participants tangible. In the next section, we present the different processes which
contribute to this rare transformation from latent to overt conflict.
THE PROCESSES OF CONVERTING LATENT TO OVERT CONFLICT
In this section, we will consider four elements that intervene in the difficult process of
turning a latent into an overt conflict. The first two elements refer to what happens during
the discussion itself: first, the making of alliances between participants; secondly, the use
of biographical narratives as arguments at the point of personal involvement in group
conflict. The third element is deduced from the attitudes of the participants who contribute
the most to the overt expression of conflict in the group: getting involved in such conflicts
seems to require a certain hierarchy of one’s social and ideological identifications. Lastly,
we briefly examine the complex influence of political competence on the way conflict is
expressed in public discussion.
Conflict is Fuelled by Alliances Between Participants
Michael Billig reminds us that when voicing opinions in a real-life situation, you have to
mobilize a dual reference system referring both to the subjects broached and to the people
you are exchanging views with. He shows how in group discussions between close friends
or relations (family members, friends or neighbours), the stance each participant assumes
in relation to others does as much to explain the views he expresses as their substance.29
Billig rests his demonstration (amongst other things) on the previously existing relations
between the group members. We observe the same impact of the relationship between
participants on the views they express in our own research, although the design is different
in that we have brought complete strangers together. Participants do not commit
themselves in acknowledging disagreement from the beginning: they need some time to
identify the people with whom they are exchanging views.30 In these groups, voicing
personal opinions, instead of reviving well-known differences and similarities and
replicating domestic hierarchies, proceeds from risk-taking. Hence, the different processes
which facilitate this may be analysed as personal resources.
The acceptance or avoidance of conflict does not follow an alternating sequential
pattern; in most cases, they are intertwined; they are characterized by aborted attempts
28 Goffman, Interaction Ritual; Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics.
29 Michael Billig, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology (London: Sage, 1991), chap. 8,
pp. 168–94.
30 That is the reason why we organize the discussion in two sessions separated by a break. Refreshments are
provided. In some ways, the informal discussion during the break gives participants the opportunity to become
acquainted with some others.
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at expressing conflict; they proceed by fits and starts, with sudden outbursts that soon peter
out.31 The erratic nature of this process is due to the way it works. In practice, in these
groups, conflict emerges clearly when at least two persons engage with each other against
the rest of the group. In a group of strangers, the fact that no one knows for certain what
truly matters to others makes this process uncertain and erratic. The risk lies in the choice
of the alliance as much as in the choice of the opponents.
This does not mean that an individual participant will not risk voicing an opinion on his
or her own which not only clashes with others but conflicts with them in such a way that
a cleavage would be summoned up. Boltanski and Thevenot’s work suggests that in such
a case, the lonely protester would refer implicitly to a supportive group, possibly an abstract
one, by some kind of generalization of his arguments.32 However, that did not happen in
our groups. The following extract exemplifies how, as long as no alliance has been
concluded between two or more participants, conflict remains latent. The exchange is
taking place between the office workers, towards the end of the session, at a moment when
all the participants are fully aware of each other’s positions, and a covert hostility has been
brewing between Jean-Claude and the participants of North African origin. Hassen, a man
of Tunisian origin, takes advantage of an innocuous remark passed by Jean-Claude to add
fuel to the fire; but in keeping with his attitude throughout the session,33 he immediately
withdraws from the interaction. Farouk, who is of Moroccan origin, is left alone to go on
unveiling the cleavage between them and Jean-Claude. He does not get any backing from
Tarek – who is also of North African (Algerian) descent – who is, on the contrary, intent
on avoiding conflict. For his part, Jean-Claude does not get any support from the female
participants, and yet their behaviour all through the session suggests that they actually share
his views.
Extract 2 (Group of office workers): ‘Who are the French?’
Jean-Claude is commenting on the stereotype: the French are an undisciplined people.
HASSEN: Who are the French?
JEAN-CLAUDE: The French lack discipline in many areas, a very wide range indeed.
FAROUK [addressing Hassen with a half-smile]: The French are your dad, his dad … his
grandfather!
HASSEN: Well, my grandfather did not live in France and he did well not to.
FACILITATOR [summing up]: Hassen, ‘Who are the French?’
TAREK: Why, all those who live in France, I mean, we are not going to … us in fact. [silence]
No matter where they come from.
FACILITATOR [reading aloud from the flipchart]: So here, ‘Who are the French?’ then, ‘It is us’
‘Those who live in France?’ [silence]
TAREK: Well, as for me …
JEAN-CLAUDE [interrupting him]: No, according to me, they are those who must abide by French
law…
31 It will be noted that our observation clearly disproves our previous assumption that the process of assuming
conflict is a gradual one, which among other things, includes broadening one’s outlook and acknowledging a
cleavage prior to getting involved (Duchesne and Haegel, ‘Entretiens dans la cite´’, p. 99).
32 Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot, De la Justification: Les economies de la grandeur (Paris: Galllimard,
1991).
33 An attitude which may be accounted for by the fact that, in his opinion, he does not belong in this group.
Although he has held only menial positions, his advanced degrees had marked him for executive jobs. As a matter
of fact, he had originally been selected to join the group of managers, but as a greater number of people volunteered
to join this group, he was ultimately assigned to the group of office-workers and he is cognizant of the fact.
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TAREK [interrupting him in turn]: Personally, I would say they are those who love France.
According to me, the French are those who love France. If you don’t love France, you can’t
even begin to be French.
FACILITATOR [summing up]: They are those who love France, those who have to abide by the
law, is that correct?
JEAN-CLAUDE [intent on driving the point home]: French law.
FAROUK [with a half-smile]: In that case, people who have obtained French citizenship, but
don’t abide by French law, are not French then? If I hear you right …
MARIE: No, no!
JEAN-CLAUDE: No, no. Be they English or Indian, if they are on French territory, they have to
respect French law, whatever they do.
FAROUK: Ah, all right.
JEAN-CLAUDE: Whatever their nationality by birth.
FAROUK: So, even if … [but he smiles and does not complete his sentence]
This sequence features all the elements that might lead to the overt expression of the
cleavage along which the group has been structuring itself for almost three hours, pitting
the French by birth against the participants of North African origin. The faults in
Jean-Claude’s line of reasoning are quite blatant, and Farouk could quite easily point them
out and indeed make the man look ridiculous in the eyes of the female participants,
provided that Hassen and Tarek were prepared to support him. But Hassen zones out and
remains silent, whereas Tarek devotes all his energies to reaching a form of consensus.
By contrast, in the lengthy extract that follows next, we can observe a sequence leading
to almost full-blown conflict, in which a system of reinforcement and mutual backing is
clearly at work.
Conflict Is Fed on Exemplary Biographical Narratives
The exchange takes place among the managers, who are discussing the advantages and
drawbacks of the welfare state. Jordan, Coline and Faiz are all of African or West Indian
descent. The starting-point of the discussion was a mark drawn beside the sentence ‘No
future’. Jordan, who grew up in Seine-St-Denis, in a deprived housing estate in the suburbs
of Paris, tells the others about his life in an area where ‘no civil servant wants to live and
work’. He explains how he ‘pulled himself together and did well at school’ instead of
‘feeling rebellious’. Jessica mainly, but to a certain extent Guillaume as well, react
sarcastically to Jordan’s biographical story. As long as Jordan was the only one to offer
himself as a paragon for individual responsibility, it is easy for the other participants to
ridicule him, and to use his life history to get back at him. But when Coline passes a remark
that adds grist to his mill, she ignites the latent conflict. Faiz henceforth sides against them,
strongly justifying the welfare state. It remains unclear whether their common African
origins had previously restrained Faiz or further infuriated him.
Extract 3 (Group of managers): ‘No one takes control of their own lives anymore.’
[The facilitator wants to know who asked for a mark to be made beside the phrase ‘No future’.
This immediately sparks a heated debate during which Jordan tells about his own life.]
JESSICA: Have you always had the feeling that you did not have a good future?
GUILLAUME: [his remark is inaudible]
JORDAN: No, what I feel is that your future is what you make it.
GUILLAUME: Lucky you!
FAIZ: [his remark is inaudible]
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JORDAN: No, it’s not a matter of having the right frame of mind … It is too simplistic to say:
‘Lucky you’!
FAIZ: Well, you are lucky.
COLINE: It’s not a question of …
JORDAN: I can’t seem to make myself clear.
COLINE: It’s not a matter of luck, there is a moment when [there is a hubbub of excited
conversation] too much is expected from society.
JORDAN: That’s it, exactly.
COLINE: And I think we are all caught in a welfare state dynamic.
JORDAN: Yes, that’s it.
COLINE: When no one takes control of their own lives anymore. Whereas our parents and our
grandparents, wherever they came from, immigrants and all, would arrive, would roll up their
sleeves, and would try to carve out a life for themselves.
GUILLAUME: Yes, but there were job opportunities at that time. [numerous reactions]
JORDAN: No, it’s not even a matter of job opportunities.
COLINE: There were job opportunities, but there were also a lot of hurdles to overcome. The
opportunities were not handed to them on a plate!
FAIZ: That is not true. A few years ago, when you were a student, the people who were at
university here were sure to find jobs, people would even approach students at the Hall of
Residence with job offers. [He waves his hand as if to point to the employers huddled at the
doors of the Hall of Residence]
JORDAN: [his voice drowning out that of the others] But way back then, when our parents came
over to France for instance, they knew full well – at least some of them did – that they would
be given no help, there was no safety net at the time. It is the same if you emigrate to the US
today; there is no safety net over there; when you arrive there, you know you are on your own.
So you start from scratch and you go ahead. Whereas in France, our problem is that we have
social security, we have child benefit, so if we don’t manage, provided we don’t commit any
[he hesitates] [criminal] acts, society will automatically roll out a safety net for us.
FAIZ: But that’s simply not true. [hubbub]
JORDAN: It is true! There are social workers … who will take care of you.
FAIZ: That’s exactly what Madelin [a right-wing politician and free marketeer] keeps repeating.
JORDAN: What?
FAIZ: That’s what Madelin keeps repeating. It’s not what it’s really like in France. [laughter]
JORDAN [looks hesitant].
The alliance formed between Jordan and Coline in the course of the discussion rests upon
the exchange of autobiographical narratives which serve as models. These narratives – such
as the immigrant’s success story used in this instance – are presented as personal
experiences or the experiences of close relatives. They are expressed and received in an
emotional way, and are presented in such a way that they aim to disclose the truth, not just
about the narrator, but also about the whole group, and beyond that, about society at large.
Jessica and Franc¸ois try to reduce Jordan’s narrative to an individual, anecdotal level. They
ask: ‘You are not going to tell us the story of your life, are you?’ And they comment:
‘Lucky you!’ as he is seeking to infuse a broader meaning into it – ‘I can’t make myself
clear,’ he says. Coline concurs in this broader meaning when she butts in to back him up,
by using ‘they’ instead of ‘I’, and above all, by intertwining their two stories through the
evocation of their grandparents.
The mention of such narratives, recalling a personal or collective past, is the most
frequently observed feature in the involvement process. They remind us of the ‘testimony’
that Lynn Sanders presents as a more desirable alternative to deliberation if we try to widen
the scope of political discussion to ‘real’ people (by contrast with the abstract ‘citizens’
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that theoreticians consider).34 Narratives are ways of fostering shared understanding
among members of a polity. As Young emphasized, storytelling, narratives, are ‘means
of politicizing’, because they are part of the sharing of experiences and of the process of
‘consciousness-raising’.35 What our experiment shows very clearly is that the outcome
depends on whether their exemplary dimension is accepted or called into question.36 This
exemplary dimension, in so far as it involves admitting that you share a common historical
heritage, reveals the main lines of cleavage, the main long-standing social and ideological
dividing-lines that polarize opinion deep down in any society.
Tension Between Cleavages and the Hierarchy of Identification
To express one’s opinion in public discussion with unknown people means taking a risk:
these opinions might reveal that the others not only disagree with you, but also that their
opinions are not compatible with yours, that they belong to a rival side. In this sense, the
conflict-based approach clearly permits us to observe what citizens deem important enough
to justify taking part in a political debate with complete strangers. Ultimately, this method
enables us to account dynamically for cleavages, i.e. the dividing lines around which the
discussion is structured.
For the past ten years or so, research on the ideological influences at work among French
voters has revealed that the two main issues polarizing them have been authoritarianism
and ethnocentrism.37 These dimensions carry such weight that they now supersede the
traditional constituents of the right/left divide. Traditionally, the right/left divide used to
be constructed first and foremost around opposite attitudes towards free enterprise and state
intervention. Nowadays, although the economic and social divide persists, it has become
much less clear-cut, following the conversion of a great many leaders of the left to the
free-market economy. In any case, this divide now comes second after the one centred on
authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. This ideological shift, which can be identified in other
European countries as well, has gone hand in hand with a dramatic change in the French
party political system, a change obviously demonstrated by the emergence of the National
Front.38
34 Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’, pp. 369–73.
35 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 73.
36 This echoes the role played by narratives in the interaction between the individual and the collective levels,
as studied by Charles Tilly, using the notion of ‘stories’ (see Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities and Political Change
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002)), but from a different angle, since he focuses on political mobilization,
whereas we focus on belief systems and ideologies. Moreover, it also echoes the notion of ‘narratives of the self’
proposed by Giddens, who emphasizes the impact of reflexivity on modern individuals, cf. Antony Giddens,
Modernity and Self Identity, Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1991).
37 Jean Chiche, Brigitte Le Roux, Pascal Perrineau and Henry Rouanet, ‘L’Espace politique des e´lecteurs
franc¸ais a` la fin des anne´es 1990’, Revue franc¸aise de science politique, 50 (2000), 463–87; Jean Chiche, Florence
Haegel and Vincent Tiberj, ‘La Fragmentation partisane’, in Ge´rard Grunberg, Nonna Mayer and Paul M.
Sniderman, eds, La De´mocratie a` l’e´preuve (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2002), pp. 203–37. In English, see
also Robert Andersen and Jocelyn Evans, ‘Values, Cleavages and Party Choice in France, 1988–1995’, and Ge´rard
Grunberg and Etienne Schweisguth’s Reply in French Politics, 1 (2003), 83–117; Ge´rard Grunberg and Etienne
Schweisguth, ‘French Political Space: Two, Three or Four Blocs?’, and Andersen and Evans’s reply in French
Politics, 1 (2003), 331–54.
38 Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1995).
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When we analyse the content of disagreement that occurs in the sensitive moments of
focus-group discussions, where a latent conflict is being transformed into an overt conflict,
we find only a few antagonisms (authoritarian versus permissive; republican-universalism
versus multiculturalist-communitarian, free-market economy versus state intervention),
which are well-known cleavages. This confirmation of well-established findings, far from
coming as a disappointment to us, actually vouches for the fact that our sample, while
clearly too small to pretend to be representative, is not ideologically abnormal. The
confirmation is all the more welcome as the interest of our research design naturally does
not lie in bringing qualitative confirmation of quantitatively well-established findings.
What the analysis of these group discussions permits is an observation of the way the
articulation of the different cleavages operates. In particular, the tensions generated by
the authoritarian versus permissive cleavage cut on the republican-universalist versus
multiculturalist-communitarian cleavage are quite perceptible in the discussions. In
quantitative surveys, the two dimensions are regarded as part of one and the same cleavage,
and yet, after analysing focus groups, it becomes apparent that their superimposition gives
rise to significant tensions.
In the group of unskilled workers, the solidarity between the participants, born from a
shared first-hand experience of discrimination and police profiling, is seriously threatened
by their profound disagreement over ethical choices or attitudes to authority. Mansour, a
participant of African origin, finds himself in a particularly difficult position. He takes sides
with the most permissive members of the group when it comes to denouncing the
mechanisms of discrimination; but he appears more and more embarrassed as the
discussion proceeds, for when Manuel, and to a lesser degree Khaled, boast of indulging
in illegal practices, this runs counter to his own moral standards and his own authoritarian
cultural background. At a certain point, the discussion turns on racially-motivated identity
checks. Manuel reports a conversation he has had with police officers who were checking
his identity. Mansour butts in to explain that the reason why Manuel’s identity was checked
was because of the way he dresses. Manuel is wearing a bandana, an earring; his appearance
is typically that of youngsters from the deprived suburbs. Mansour tells him: ‘It’s no
wonder: seeing the way you dress, they are bound to put you in the same bag as me.’ But
Manuel cuts him off and explains that he was smoking a joint. Mansour, who made it clear
several times that he does not take drugs and condemns it, makes a new attempt to keep
some solidarity, some common belonging with Manuel by muttering ‘even if you hadn’t
been smoking a joint, you clearly look the part anyway!’
Similar tensions are perceptible within the group of managers. Guillaume, who turns
out to be highly sensitive to the expression of ethnic and cultural differences, and is eager
to denounce all forms of discrimination against coloured people, cannot reconcile his desire
to side with Faiz with the latter’s coming down strongly in favour of a repressive approach,
claiming the right to bring up children ‘the African way’, i.e., using corporal punishment
and strong social control – a stand that does not go down well with the representatives of
‘cultural liberalism’. This tension between attitudes of tolerance, indeed of solidarity with
the immigrants on the one hand, and, on the other, a rejection of the traditional authoritarian
values and practices these immigrants are proud of, is a good illustration of the complex
debate over these issues that polarize French opinion.39
39 What is at work here, is not a ‘new racism’, or a ‘symbolic racism’, where a change in the line of argument
goes hand in hand with a persistent ostracizing of ethnic minorities; what is at work is a clash between conflicting
sets of values. See Paul M. Sniderman, Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tetlock and Ann Kendrick, ‘The New Racism’,
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After analysing these group discussions, we are left with the impression that initiating
conflict requires some kind of hierarchical organization of identifications. Participants can
only become involved in the discussion and engage at the risk of conflict if they are capable
of making a choice between sometimes irreconcilable identifications, by selecting the
one(s) that appear(s) essential to them. We are talking about choosing between
identifications made in the heat of discussion. The resources mobilized are of a symbolic
and emotional rather than of a rational nature and they involve a close interweaving of the
individual and the collective. From the outset, sociological research has laid stress on
the multiple identifications of individuals, with each belonging to different groups40 and
with group affiliations that overlap,41 so that socialization occurs in a variety of ways. As
opposed to the ascriptive identities of so-called traditional societies, this multiplicity of
identifications – which is regarded as a distinctive feature of modern industrial societies
– is on the rise, due to the growing division of labour and mostly to an increased social
and geographical mobility, at both the individual and collective levels. In fact, our
experiment facilitates the observation of this plurality of value systems and identifications
at the level of each participant, which gives rise to these complex interactions between
various cleavages. It also permits us to observe how conflict requires rising above this
complexity and how it presupposes that participants are capable, at a given moment, of
making a choice between different identifications and of taking sides. In fact, it proceeds
in part from a disposition to sort these complex social identifications into a value-based
order. Indeed, if today’s homo sociologicus is characterized by the multiplicity of his or
her social roles and of his or her groups of reference, as well as of the identifications and
values that result from them,42 then our experiment would seem to demonstrate that homo
politicus for his or her part, can emerge only if a certain integration, or failing that, a
hierarchical organization of identifications is achieved.43
The Complex Interaction Between Political Competence and Conflict Involvement
We discussed in the preceding section how latent conflict turns into an overt one by
analysing the resources that lead participants to assume their differences of opinion. The
social characteristics of group members have contradictory effects on this process:
participants need to be able to assess the implications of others’ opinions and to feel
confident enough to take the risk of expressing their own views, capacities that are
strengthened by higher social status; but too much cognitive competence may dilute
conflict. Basically, as Carl Schmitt says, ‘people do not face each other as abstractions’:
they get involved in an open conflict when they can get support from others; this support
is garnered by giving something of themselves, something personal, some biographical
elements which can be shared as a common experience or memory. This process apparently
requires from participants a certain capacity to choose between one’s identifications. But
(F’note continued)
American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 423–47; J. B. MacConahay and J. C. Hough, ‘Symbolic Racism’,
Journal of Social Issues, 32 (1976), 23–45.
40 Maurice Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la me´moire (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994 [1925]).
41 Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations.
42 Bernard Lahire, L’Homme pluriel: les ressorts de l’action (Paris: Nathan, 1998).
43 Further development of this hypothesis is to be found in S. Duchesne and V. Scherrer, ‘L’Identite´ politique
comme force de combinaison et de conflictualisation des appartenances sociales: justification the´orique d’une
de´finition empirique’, in Identite´(s), Actes du colloque de la MSHS de Poitiers, Presses Universitaires de Rennes,
2003, pp. 325–36,  http://erg.politics.ox.ac.uk/duchesne.asp .
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does the fact that someone is or is not politically competent44 make any difference in his
or her disposition to contribute to an open conflict?
We know from a short questionnaire filled in by the participants at the end of each session
that some of them do take an interest in politics.45 However, in the course of the discussions,
nobody directly voiced his own preferences or displayed his knowledge of political
matters. Apparently, it is less embarrassing to confess to complete strangers, in front of
a camera, that you have stolen a moped or that you smoke pot, than to publicly declare
where you stand politically. Explicit references to political players (members of
government, political parties, elected officials, etc.) were extremely rare.46 What is more,
identifying the ideological systems that may inspire the views expressed and/or upheld by
the participants is no easy task. To identify them, the words they use appear less reliable
than the way people argue. Words with ideological overtones undoubtedly indicate that
the participant is conversant with politics, but it does not mean that he adheres to a
fully-fledged ideology. The use of the word ‘capitalism’, for instance, is not a reliable
indicator that the participant’s views are structured along strong ideological lines, for it
does not predict the opinions that will influence his involvement at other stages of the
discussion. Taking together all the interventions of a participant rather suggests that most
people tend to cobble together disparate elements taken sometimes from similar,
sometimes from different ideological systems.47 In a few cases, however, there is evidence
that some participants have a strong ideological structure as well as a good command of
specialized political categories at their disposal. This is not apparent, as might be expected,
from their speaking more than the others. Indeed, it is not because a person seems to have
great political competence that he will monopolize the conversation and impose his views
on others. In these groups, what characterizes the participants with a high degree of political
competence is rather their ability to encode and decode people’s words politically, in other
words, to read accurately, into what is being said by others, implications or consequences
that far exceed the content of those words.
Franc¸ois (managers’ group) is the best illustration of this type of attitude. He stayed in
the background all through the three hours discussion, while clearly keeping track of the
conversation. The few words he volunteered during the final sequence are a case in point.
To one participant, who complained about those youngsters who mess up the Metro with
graffiti and tags and who should be reprimanded, he retorted that these youngsters might
well counter by denouncing in turn all those advertisements that debase women and are
44 The notion of ‘political competence’ used by Bourdieu is quite close to what American speakers call ‘political
sophistication’, but it refers not only to the objective ability to gain command of the specialized knowledge
necessary for players in party-political and electoral competition (political know-how and full command of the
classification schemes of the political scene), but also to the subjective feeling that one is fully entitled to have
one’s say in political matters (Pierre Bourdieu, ‘L’Opinion publique n’existe pas’, Les Temps Modernes,
378 (1973), 1292–309; Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Public Opinion Does Not Exist’, in Sociology in Question (London:
Sage, 1993).
45 The participants’ interest in politics was as follows: managers (total, 7) – a lot, 5; a little, 2; office workers
(total, 7) – a lot, 3; a little, 3; not at all, 1; unskilled workers (total, 6) – a lot, 1; a little, 3; not at all, 2.
46 In all the interviews, only three mentions of political professionals are to be found, and they are all prominent
ones: there is one mention of Alain Madelin, a right-wing leader and staunch free marketeer; one mention of
Bernard Tapie, a business man who went into politics under Franc¸ois Mitterrand’s second presidential mandate
and was implicated in corruption scandals; and one mention of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former socialist finance
minister, noting that he had been elected on a very low voter turnout at the polls.
47 Billig, Ideology and Opinions; Elizabeth Frazer, ‘Teenage Girls Reading Jackie’, Media, Culture and
Society, 9 (1987), 407–25.
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more shocking than graffiti. When a participant of African descent said that to maintain
law and order, you have to speak the right language, i.e. the one spoken in African villages,
Franc¸ois concluded that the police should recruit more immigrants. Lastly, when the
discussion revolved around how ordinary citizens can participate in the fight against
delinquency, he spoke again to say that to begin with, people should not send their children
to private schools, and should not become obsessed with law and order. These examples
make plain that Franc¸ois adheres to a well-structured belief system. Unlike other
participants, he intervenes but rarely, and not really to add to, support or back up what has
just been said or to ally himself with others and, by so doing, contribute to introducing
conflict in the discussion. Rather, he is always slightly ahead of the others. His remarks
always tend to shift the conversation to other subjects – in so far that is, that others follow
him on to this new ground, which is seldom the case.
Franc¸ois did not get support from others nor make alliances with them. Moreover, he
never offered arguments taken from his personal experience: his points always refer to
external evidence. Different elements may contribute to explain his attitude. First, Francois
was the only one in the group who was not unemployed: he applied for the discussion
because he was interested but actually had a job. This may have distanced him from the
others more than we might suppose. Secondly, the arguments he used in the discussion
may be too sophisticated and implicit for the others who are obviously less politically
competent and may have missed the point. Lastly, his political competence may have
caused a different attitude towards discussion which elicits conflict but lacks personal
involvement.
So participation in overt conflict is not necessarily reinforced by political competence,
although it may be, as in the case of Faiz. Faiz is a manager of Chadian descent. In the
course of the discussion, he discloses the fact that he trained in a communist country to
be an engineer. Obviously, he has strong ideological commitments, as shown by his ability
to decode other people’s words, as well as by his competitive, not to say contentious,
attitude, complete with an apparent total lack of self-doubt and an eagerness to bring others
round to his point of view. Faiz’s behaviour singles him out, by the consistency and
single-mindedness of his remarks, as well as their purpose. Each of his interventions is
actually an attempt to tackle the issue under discussion from a new angle of his own. Unlike
Franc¸ois, Faiz occasionally gets involved in the discussion and exposes himself by
disclosing personal details. This is the case when, in a very emotional way, he mentions
that his daughter is becoming discouraged from going on with her studies by the fact
that both her parents, though highly-qualified, cannot find jobs on account of their ethnic
origin.
In a previous work, based on individual interviews,48 we have underlined the fact that
one can be politically competent without becoming involved: competence does not
necessarily cause people to take sides and clearly stand for the cleavages that are most
important to them. These experimental focus groups suggest some hypotheses which can
explain this quite complex relationship between political competence and involvement in
public discussion. Political competence gives a participant the ability to understand easily
which conflicts are at stake in the discussion and the confidence to induce conflict. But,
as shown empirically by these focus groups, the expression of political competence is not
sufficient (and might even sometimes seem counter-productive) to rally others to one’s side
48 Duchesne and Haegel, ‘Entretiens dans la cite´’.
20 D U C H E S N E A N D H A E G E L
and to make conflicts overt. To do so, participants must look for others’ support; and getting
support requires exposing oneself personally by disclosing elements of one’s own (or one’s
relative’s) life to which others can relate.
CONCLUSION
Our experiment was carried out only in France and we have left aside the question of the
transferability of the hypotheses, as we are aware of the French political specificity. In
many respects, France is by no means unique, since dwindling trust in political
institutions,49 a rising abstention rate50 and massive changes in political commitment51 are
to be observed in other countries as well. However, conflict has been considered as the main
feature of French culture and of the French political system. Historically, the prominent
place of conflicts in French society along with the ambivalent attitude of the French towards
authority, which they both revere and challenge, have long been highlighted by a great
many English-speaking specialists of French politics.52 The French political system is
characterized by a high degree of polarization53 and by the existence of political parties
at the far ends of the political spectrum.54 This may explain why study of the French
political system has led us ‘as a matter of course’ to place conflict at the heart of our
theoretical and empirical design. The next step of this research programme is therefore
putting the validity of our approach to the test in other societies that are not traditionally
characterized as contentious, in particular, British society and that of the French-speaking
part of Belgium. However, we would like to conclude by emphasizing three main possible
consequences of our findings.
First, in our research, the conflict-based approach did not lead us to identify conflict
everywhere in discussions. On the contrary, we observe that conflict generally remains
latent and that assuming conflict in public requires specific conditions and processes. For
the individuals, politicization is demanding, it is a process of involvement and cannot be
taken for granted. However, in academic literature as well as in public debates, it is often
49 Etienne Schweisguth, ‘La De´politisation en questions’, in Grunberg, Mayer and Sniderman, eds, La
De´mocratie a` l’e´preuve, pp. 50–86; Pippa Norris ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph S. Nye, Philip H. Zelikow and David C. King, eds,
Why People Don’t Trust Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
50 Anne Muxel and Je´roˆme Jaffre´, ‘S’Abstenir: hors du jeu ou dans le jeu politique?’ in P. Bre´chon, A. Laurent
and P. Perrineau, eds, Les Cultures politiques des Franc¸ais (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2000), pp. 19–52; Mark
N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
51 Pascal Perrineau, ed., L’Engagement politique: de´clin ou mutation? (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1994);
Isabelle Sommier, Le Renouveau des mouvements contestataires a` l’heure de la mondialisation (Paris:
Flammarion, 2003); Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, Parties Without Partisans: Political Change
in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
52 Stanley Hoffman et al., In Search of France (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); Charles
Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); William Schonfeld,
Obedience and Revolt: French Behaviour Towards Authority (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); Theodore Zeldin,
Politics and Anger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
53 Giovani Sartori, ‘European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism’, in Joseph Palombara and
Myron Werner, eds, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1966), pp. 137–76.
54 For a long time, political conflicts were fuelled by the existence of a strong Communist Party in conjunction
with strong anti-communist feelings, but this antagonism has lost much of its virulence, following the decline of
the French Communist Party. Currently, however, the fact that the far-right National Front has taken root is
nurturing a different kind of ideological and partisan polarization.
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suggested that depoliticization puts democracy at risk. The explanations or supposed
causes of depoliticization are manifold. Nina Eliasoph, in her brilliant work, insists on the
evaporation of the political in American society. She supposes that the anthropological
process of politicization is prevented by American culture and institutions. We agree that
there are constraints on the politicization process; but we also think that this would not be
enough to suppress them: politicization has to be voluntarily produced. Improving political
involvement requires a specific or even a creative effort.
Secondly, we address the question of the quite complex relationship between political
competence and politicization in public discussion. In our study, personal involvement is
the necessary condition for politicization. Political competence is not directly related to
political involvement; it does not necessarily cause people to take sides. Personal
involvement does require the capacity to organize or at least to prioritize one’s affiliations
and identifications. This result matches the situation of contemporary Western societies,
where people are more and more educated and hence politically competent, where
affiliation and identification systems are more and more fragmented, and where citizens
are suspected of distancing themselves more and more from politics.
Lastly, let us come back to the debate between a conflict-based approach and a
deliberative model of democracy. The theoretical debate about deliberative democracy has
re-emphasized the role of political discussion in the democratic system: everyday talk is
assigned a central role in the deliberative process.55 This refocusing of the study of political
discussion changes expectations about it. Our experimentation reveals at least that a
deliberative model is not sufficient to account for what is at stake in public discussions.
Political discussion not only gives rise to an exchange of opinions aiming at understanding
each other’s point of view and reaching consensus; it also produces expressions of
disagreement, which sometimes coincide with durable conflict. Opinions about public
questions, about topics that are potentially of interest for a large portion of society, are not
only ideas: they are also signs, markers, which tell others which groups one belongs to.
A P P E N D I X : I N T E R V I E W S C E N A R I O
9.45: Opening question: ‘What does delinquency mean to you?’ (The participants answer orally and publicly
and the facilitator writes down their answers on a flipchart.)
10.15: Question to be answered in writing: ‘How come some people drift into delinquency?’ The participants
are divided into two or three groups and are given 25 minutes to note down their answers on a few cards
which are subsequently stuck up on the notice-board and discussed by the whole group.
11.05: Benchmark question: ‘What are the three factors/causes about which you feel something should be
done?’ Each participant is given three coloured sticky labels to be stuck next to the answers (s)he has
selected.
11.15: Break
11.30: The three groups are requested to complete a scenario: for the group of managers and the group of
unskilled workers, the script reads as follows: ‘A couple who are just coming out of a hypermarket are
requested by a security guard to open their bags for inspection; he sees that they have stolen a mobile phone.
What do you think happens next? Who are the various protagonists in the story? Who is involved/concerned?
Who should intervene? What should be done?’
For the group of office workers, the script reads as follows: ‘An old lady has her handbag snatched from
her by two youths riding a moped.’ Same set of questions.
11.45: The group is divided into two subgroups; each subgroup elaborates a scenario.
55 Jane Mansbridge, ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System’, in Macedo, Deliberative Politics, pp. 211–39.
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12.15: Presentation of the first scenario.
12.30: Presentation of the second scenario.
12.45: Theory up for discussion: ‘There is not much the average man or woman in the street can do to fight
against delinquency.’ Each participant casts his/her vote on the theory written on the notice-board, by using
  ,  , -, or - - signs, then the votes are commented upon.
